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Bhartçhari’s Vākyapadīya (VP) is notorious for the multiplicity of the mutually 
exclusive doctrines expounded there, without any final solution. This paper aims to 
demonstrate that in the case of every controversial question discussed in VP, the 
variety of views on it can be reduced to a basic antinomy which serves as a kind of 
proposition for the problem under consideration. These antinomies are sometimes 
expressed explicitly but very often they are hidden in the text of VP. The fundamental 
dichotomy is the opposition between pluralism and monism, the origin of which in 
turn can be traced in the contradiction between the grammatical background and 
ontological trends of Bhartçhari’s philosophy. 
The way in which Bhartçhari integrates these extremities into a total system is 
analyzed in this paper on the basis of some passages, dealing with a certain 
semantic problem, from the 1st and the 3rd kāõóas of VP. Attention is focused on the 
concept of activity and its role in Bhartçhari’s philosophical discourse.  
 
 
The Vākyapadīya is well known as a treatise on grammatical philosophy, which 
presents an ontological dimension of Vyākaraõa. In the modern methodological 
paradigm, however, grammar and philosophy are usually distinguished and treated as 
different disciplines. As a result, there emerge two major approaches to the 
interpretation of VP. The first of them deals mainly with ontological problems, whereas 
the second emphasizes grammatical facets of VP regarding them from the point of view 
of either the Pāõinian tradition or of the modern linguistics. Nevertheless, in the text of 
VP, grammar and ontology are really never separated. 
Another problem that inevitably arises in the interpretation of VP is the problem of 
attribution. As a rule, in Indian philosophical texts one or several pūrvapakùas are 
followed by uttarapakùa, which is the view of the author of the text. Bhartçhari, on the 
contrary, is notorious for the multiplicity of the mutually exclusive doctrines he 
expounded in VP, without specifying which of them his own one is. 
This methodological approach, designated by J. Houben as perspectivism (Houben 
1995a, Houben 1997), was in concordance with the traditional status of Vyākaraõa as a 
science embracing all other disciplines. The reason for Bhartçhari to be so careful in 
drawing firm conclusions was probably the complexity of the issues he was talking 
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about, for he was not a realist of the Nyāya type and therefore did not have to believe in 
direct correspondence between words and reality. 
A study of Bhartçhari may consist in the analysis of individual standpoints, which is 
justified, because one cannot fully understand the text unless every part of it is 
understood properly. On the other hand, as it is emphasized by the concept of the 
hermeneutic circle proposed by Friedrich Schleiermacher and later on developed by 
modern hermeneutics, the parts can be understood only from the whole.1 Therefore 
another approach is necessary that provides us with a kind of synthesis, which enables 
to reconstruct the original complexity of the text. 
This paper aims to demonstrate that in the case of every controversial question 
discussed in VP, the variety of views on it can be reduced to a basic antinomy which 
serves as a kind of proposition for the problem under consideration. These antinomies 
are sometimes expressed explicitly but very often they are hidden in the text  
of VP.  
The fundamental dichotomy in Bhartçhari’s philosophy is the opposition between 
monism and pluralism. The ontological views of VP can be characterized as non- 
dual monism. Still every strict monistic system obviously tries to eliminate the 
diversity of the world, regarding it to be unreal. Bhartçhari, on the other hand, was a 
follower of the Vyākaraõa and therefore had to acknowledge the existence of the 
objects of grammatical analysis. That accounts for the variety of pluralistic doctrines in 
the text of VP. 
It can be assumed that for each school of Indian Philosophy the acceptance of 
monistic or pluralistic ontology was not the result of arbitrary decision. On the contrary, 
it was stipulated by the character of the non-philosophical practical activity that 
historically had formed the basis of this school. Accordingly, it would be natural that on 
the basis of the Vyākaraõa there emerged a discontinuous system of language 
philosophy which would be closer to the Vaiśeùika. In reality, however, grammatical 
ontology turns out to be more similar to the Advaita-vedānta. 
The way in which Bhartçhari integrates these polar trends into a total system is 
demonstrated in this paper on the basis of some passages dealing with certain semantic 
problem, from the 1st and the 3rd kāõóas of VP.  
 
Preliminary remarks on the concept of activity 
It is worth noting that Indian semantics, unlike European, has never operated with 
static structures. It has considered the word and its meaning not per se, but as items 
involved in verbal communication. Already the first vārttika of Kātyāyana claims that 
____________ 
1
 Or, translating this idea into the language of Indian Grammar: to understand individual śabdas 
from the text, we have to understand the whole text as a single śabda, and vice versa. 
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the relation between śabda and artha, i.e. the word and its object, is permanent because 
of the usage by people and that grammar imposes restrictions on this verbal usage in the 
same way as other restrictions regulate other kinds of worldly and ritual activity.2 
The concept of activity plays a very important role in Bhartçhari’s philosophy. 
Attention to it, as will be shown below, provides us with solution of some controversial 
points in VP. This is why a brief analysis of terms used by Indian grammarians with 
concern to activity is quite helpful here.  
Among the Sanskrit words expressing the idea of activity, the most common is 
vyavahāra which in grammatical context unambiguously means ‘verbal com- 
munication.’ In such meaning it is already used in the Mbh (Mbh 1880–1885, I: 2) and 
many times by Bhartçhari. 
For a grammarian, verbal communication (certainly the correct one, not apaśabda) 
is an important justification of his discourse. On the other hand, each kind of activity is 
not necessarily connected with a certain theoretical outlook and can therefore be 
explained by means of different concepts. As Bhartçhari points out in VP 1.71:  
Practical activity is accomplished resting on different doctrines. And what some hold as 
principal, can be contrary for the others.3 
Vyavahāra is opposed to paramārtha, the ultimate ontological reality, which is 
beyond relativization. For Bhartçhari, paramārtha is the ultimate reality or śabdatattva, 
the absolute non-dual principle. The pāramārthika level is certainly unique, but there 
are many different vyāvahārika levels. Different aspects of the phenomenal world can 
be explained by means of different doctrines, each of them implying a specific 
operative reality. These realities can be characterized as quasi-ontological, because 
they are not ultimate. 
The distinction between relative and ontological levels of description plays a 
fundamental role in Bhartçhari’s philosophy. As a result, among the variety of ways of 
considering each problem enumerated in VP, one usually represents the ontological 
point of view whereas the others express different pragmatic (i.e. grammatical) 
approaches to the issue under discussion. 
Another term that refers to activity is vyāpāra, which literally means ‘occupation, 
action.’ In contrast to vyavahāra, vyāpāra has a narrower meaning, denoting an 
individual process, a distinct action (see VP 3.3.28).  
The word kārya has a wide range of meanings, including that of ‘grammatical 
operation’, i.e. an exemplary activity in the context of grammatical philosophy (cf. VP 
1.59). 
____________ 
2
 siddhe śabdārthasaübandhe lokato ‘rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreõa dharmaniyamaþ, yathā 
laukikavaidikeùu. 
3
 bhinnadarśanam āśritya vyavahāro ‘nugamyate / 
tatra yan mukhyam ekeùāü tatrānyeùāü viparyayaþ // 1.75 // 
Numeration of the kārikās is given according to Rau’s critical edition. 
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In some passages of VP ‘activity’ is also referred to by such words as pravçtti 
‘application’ and pradeśa ‘context’ (the latter term is understood in VP 1.70 as the 
context of a certain activity). 
All these aspects of activity per se must be distinguished from physical actions 
(kriyā, karman) defined ostensively by Patañjali as “moving, stirring, winking”4 (Mbh 
1880–1885 I:1), as well as from the six transformations of being (śaóbhāvavikārāþ). 
The latter are mentioned in VP 1.1.3, but for the first time they appear in Yaska’s 
Nirukta:  
There are six transformations of Being, according to Vārùyāyaõi: to be born, to exist, to 
change, to grow, to diminish, to perish.5  
The internal structure of these six actions is quite clear and can be easily divided 
into three pairs on account of the following features:  
origination (jayate) – destruction (vinaśyati),  
static being (asti)– essential alteration (vipariõamate),  
quantitative increase (vardhate) – quantitative decrease (apakùīyate).  
These six modes and processes are considered as basic on account of the 
functioning of the objects. However, the idea of activity, referred to by vyavahāra and 
other related terms, is centered on the subject which is involved in this activity and 
serves as a reference point for it. 
 
The fundamental antinomy of the word 
According to the first kārikās of VP, the integral indivisible word, the śabda- 
brahman, is the foundation and the source of the universe. Being integral, it appears as 
separate, because of the recourse to different capacities from which it in fact is not 
separate.6 Still, for a grammarian who deals with the functioning of the word in the 
course of verbal communication, the plurality of acoustical manifestations of the word 
as well as of its meanings is quite obvious. 
Having finished the introductory part of the first kāõóa, in VP I.44 Bhartçhari turns 
directly to this problem, claiming that śabda is composed of two separate aspects, each 
of them also called śabda.7 In fact, the ambivalence of śabda was already emphasized 
____________ 
4
 iõgitaü ceùñitaü nimeùitaü [...] 
5
 ùaóbhāvavikārā bhavantīti vārùyāyaõiþ. jayate ‘sti vipariõamate vardhate ‘pakùīyate vinaśyatīti 
(Yaska 1985:105). This phrase is also cited by Patañjali in A 1.3.1 (Mbh I: 258). 
6
 anādinidhanaü brahma śabdatattvaü yad akùaram / 
vivartate ‘rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataþ // 1.1 // 
ekam eva yad āmnātaü bhinnaśaktivyapāśrayāt / 
apçthaktve ‘pi śaktibhyaþ pçthaktveneva vartate // 1.2 // 
7
 dvāv upādānaśabdeùu śabdau śabdavido viduþ / 
eko nimittaü śabdānām aparo ‘rthe prayujyate // 1.44 // 
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by Patañjali who defined it as “that by utterance of which [the referent] is apprehended 
[…],” but also as an articulated sound.8 
Following this trend, Bhartçhari specifies that there are at least two attitudes towards 
the nature of these śabdas. Some claim that there is an essential difference between 
them, whereas others suppose the indivisible to be taken as different due to the duality 
of mind.9 In the following kārikās (VP 1.44–71) arguments are sometimes posed in 
favour of the first and sometimes of the second opinion.  
This passage was analyzed by Houben who arrived at a conclusion that for 
Bhartçhari both approaches are alternative and equivalent. Houben proposed the 
concept of two models: the ‘two-level’ and the ‘two-capacity’ models according to 
which he explained the contents of the passage. The former model represents the 
essential difference between the acoustic and semantic levels of the word, whereas in 
conformity with the latter the integral “word has two capacities: it reveals its own form 
and the thing-meant” (Houben 1995c: 69–75). 
There may be a few disagreements about Houben’s interpretation of certain single 
kārikās, e.g., VP 1.5210 which he explains as illustrating the ‘two-level’ model (Houben 
1995c: 70), although the idea that different stages of the development of an egg are of 
different nature obviously contradicts the satkāryavāda principle.11 More important is 
that every model, being only an imitation of reality, cannot comprise all the facets of 
such multidimensional text as VP. The weak point in Houben’s concept is that it neither 
explains the chaotic way in which the kārikās, belonging to different models, are 
expounded in VP, nor demonstrates the place of these models in the text as a whole. 
The following part of the paper proposes an alternative analysis of the passage 
starting with the kārikā VP 1.44, where it is claimed that the word is composed of two 
separate aspects. Since in the next kārikās several potential pairs of such aspects are 
adduced, it can be concluded that the dual character of the distinction appears only 
because it is convenient to operate with binary oppositions. In the passage under 
consideration, two major parts can be distinguished. In the first of them Bhartçhari 
examines the plural external manifestations of the indivisible word and in the second he 
turns to the plurality of its meanings. 
____________ 
8
 yenoccaritena [...] saüpratyayo bhavati sa śabdaþ. athavā pratītapadārthako loke dhvaniþ śabda 
ityucyate (Мbh I: 1). 
9
 ātmabhedaü tayoþ ke cid astīty āhuþ purāõagāþ  / 
buddhibhedād abhinnasya bhedam eke pracakùate  // 1.46 // 
10
 āõóabhāvam ivāpanno yaþ kratuþ śabdasaüjñakaþ  / 
vçttis tasya kriyārūpā bhāgaśo bhajate kramam  // 1.52 // 
11
 Cf. fn.14. The alternative interpretation of the kārikā is given by J. Bronkhorst: “The word, 
which in itself has no parts and no sequence, unfolds itself as to give rise to something that appears to 
have both, just as the vital essence (rasa) of a pea-cock’s egg, which does not possess the variety of 
colours of a peacock, unfolds itself so as to give rise to a peacock that does” (Bronkhorst 2001: 481). 
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The plurality of the audible manifestations of the word 
In everyday practice, the unchangeable mental image of the word (buddhisthaþ 
śabdaþ) can be naturally distinguished from its different acoustic manifestations. Still 
this does not mean that they are of different nature. In VP 1.47 it is claimed that the 
former is the cause of the latter: 
Like the light concealed in the piece of kindling wood is the cause of the manifestation 
(prakāśa) of another [light], in the same way the mental word is the cause of every audible 
[word].12 
According to the Vçtti, the fire, potentially concealed in the kindling wood, once 
inflamed, illuminates itself (cf. VP 1.56) as well as other objects. It is the same way 
with the levels of word manifestation. The mental word, corresponding to the 
madhyamā level, causes the manifestation of individual audible words belonging to the 
vaikharī level.13 This conclusion follows from Bhartçhari’s acceptance of the sat- 
kāryavāda, which is in turn obvious from the first kārikā of VP, where it is claimed that 
the whole object world spreads (vivartate) from the śabda-brahman.14 
In the next kārikās it is claimed that although the distinction between the mental and 
the audible words may be useful for the description of a verbal communication, from 
the ontological point of view it is invalid. It is the indivisible word that acquires 
succession in the phonemes as if being differentiated. Modifications, which the mental 
word is subject to in the course of audible manifestation, have the same character as the 
changes which the reflection of an object undergoes because of the movement of  
water.15 
Summing up the passage VP 1.47–50, it can be assumed that the first line of the 
kārikā 1.46 is probably not Bhartçhari’s final solution.16 On the contrary, the adoption 
of the essential difference between the śabdas could have been the viewpoint of some 
of his opponents. But it is also possible that both outlooks expounded in this kārikā do 
____________ 
12
 araõisthaü yathā jyotiþ prakāśāntarakāraõam  / 
tadvac chabdo ‘pi buddhisthaþ śrutīnāü kāraõaü pçthak  // 1.47 // 
13
 Explicitly the concept of the three speech levels was expounded only in VP 1.159.  
14
 It’s true that Bhartçhari’s treatment of satkāryavāda doesn’t confirm to its traditional division 
into vivartavāda of the Advaitavedāntins and the pariõāmavāda of the adherents of Sāükhya (Cf. 
Pandit 2004: 145–148). Subramania Iyer on some other occasion notes that even the distinction of the 
sātkārya- and the asatkāryavāda is based upon the alleged difference of Being and non-Being and 
therefore is senseless (Subramania Iyer 1991: 216). This is, however, the next step towards the 
absolute monism. 
15
 nādasya kramajātatvān na pūrvo na paraś ca saþ  / 
akramaþ kramarūpeõa bhedavān iva jāyate  // 1.49 // 
pratibimbaü yathānyatra sthitaü toyakriyāvaśāt  / 
tatpravçttim ivānveti sa dharmaþ sphoñanādayoþ  // 1.50 // 
16
 The more so as the opinion in the first line is marked by ke cid, and according to Aklujkar, 
referred to by Houben (Houben 1992: 221), “a view attributed to apare is usually acceptable 
Bhartçhari, and a view attributed to ke cid is unacceptable or acceptable only with qualifications.” 
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not represent the divergence of rival traditions, but express different methodological 
approaches, each of them justified in a certain cognitive situation. 
Discussing the way in which the word operates in the course of verbal com- 
mucation, it is natural to regard it as a composite unit. Still, because the primary intention 
of Bhartçhari was apparently the ontologisation of grammar, he naturally had to specify 
the ontological status of the components introduced. And then, after all, it is the doctrine 
of the integral word that solves this problem. No wonder, in the kārikā 1.46 it was quoted 
in the second place as uttarapakùa, i.e. the opinion of the author of the text. 
 
The plurality of meanings 
In the passage VP 1.51–71, the antinomy of the integral vs. compound nature of the 
word appears in a different exposition. Here Bhartçhari examines the plurality of 
meanings of the indivisible śabda. He claims that apart from the thing-meant the word 
refers to its own form (śabdasvarūpa) which thus becomes distinctly signified. That is 
to say, each word is a signifier of itself―of an integral word that has a signifier and a 
signified aspect.  
The starting point for this idea is a well-known Pāõinian sūtra A 1.1.68: svaü rūpaü 
śabdasyāśabdasaüjñā. According to the Kāśikāvçtti, this sūtra concerns only grammar, 
maintaining that grammar operates with the words and not with their referents. 
Patañjali, in his commentary on this sūtra, at first also tends to agree that its scope is 
restricted to grammar. But then he quotes a vārttika of Kātyāyana, according to which 
(although this view seems to be open to argument) even in ordinary speech the 
apprehension of the word always precedes the apprehension of the referent.17 For 
instance, in the situation of asking to repeat one’s words it is the form but not the 
meaning of the word which has been asked about.18 
Bhartçhari’s attitude towards the śabdasvarūpa is quite controversial. Hideyo 
Ogawa in his article “Bhartçhari on A 1.1.68” proposes a very sophisticated 
interpretation. He claims that “A.1.1.68 never describes the self-referring nature of the 
linguistic item” (Ogawa 2001: 536). Attempting to represent the kārikās of VP as a kind 
of formal anuvçtti on Pāõini, Ogawa does not use the term ‘metalanguage,’ but in his 
view śabdasvarūpa in fact appears to be a kind of an intermediate item separating the 
metalanguage of the sūtras from the generated object language. The question of the 
ontological status of this item is disregarded, and from several standpoints, expounded 
____________ 
17
 Na vā śabdapūrvako hyarthe saüpratyayastasmād arthanivçttiþ Vt. 2 (498) on 1.1.68 (Мbh 1: 
176). (On  the meaning of ‘na vā’, see Kiparsky 1979). 
18
 śabdapūrvako hyarthasya saüpratyayaþ. ātaśca śabdapūrvako yo ‘pi hyasāvāhūyate nāmnā 
nāma yadānena nopalabdhaü bhavati tadā pçcchati kiü bhavānāheti (Мbh I: 176). Also Bhartçhari in 
VP I.58 gives this example. 
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in the Vçtti on VP 1.69–70, the only one is quoted which is in agreement with the 
chosen interpretation. 
Still Bhartçhari in VP 1.64–65 points at the weak place of each concept of 
metalanguage, however useful it may seem to be. Every procedure of analysis, he 
claims, can be repeated many times, therefore there would be an infinite regress of 
intermediate (guõaþ – VP 1.63) items, in the very same way as every common property, 
which is the basis of comparison, can itself act as an object of comparison on account of 
another property, etc.19 
 
Self-reference in VP 
Pro 
In the first kāõóa as well in the Saübandha-samuddeśa, the question of 
self-reference of the word is discussed more comprehensively. In the passage VP 
1.51–70 it is claimed that in every word the form of the referent as well as its own form 
are manifested.20 The proper form is essential in every verbal communication, because 
both the speaker and the hearer grasp it, often unconsciously, before drawing attention 
to the meaning.21 It happens so because the word, similarly to light, has two capacities: 
to be perceived and to cause perception.22  
In the situation when the connection between the name and the thing named has not 
been established yet, the word, too, has its own form as does its meaning. Otherwise, in 
a phrase like gaur vāhīkaþ ‘vāhīkaþ is cow’, the words ‘vāhīkaþ’ and ‘gau’ would be 
meaningless, because they don’t refer to any object. Thus, the first vārttika of 
Kātyāyana would be violated. 
In the initial verses of the Saübandha-samuddeśa, the proper form is proclaimed to 
be understandable from the word, along with the external referent, and the intention of 
the speaker being the most intrinsic thing-meant of the three.23 
 
____________ 
19
 sāmānyam āśritaü yad yad upamānopameyayoþ  / 
tasya tasyopamāneùu dharmo ‘nyo vyatiricyate  // 1.64 // 
guõaþ prakarùahetur yaþ svātantryeõopadiśyate  / 
tasyāśritād guõād eva prakçùñatvaü pratīyate  // 1.65 // 
20
 artharūpaü tathā śabde svarūpaü ca prakāśate  // 1.51 // 
21
 yathā prayoktuþ prāg buddhiþ śabdeùv eva pravartate  / 
vyavasāyo grahītéõām evaü teùv eva jāyate  // 1.54 //  
22
 grāhyatvaü grāhakatvaü ca dve śaktī tejaso yathā  / 
tathaiva sarvaśabdānām ete pçthag avasthite  // 1.56 //  
23
 jñānaü prayoktur bāhyo ‘rthaþ svarūpaü ca pratīyate  / 
śabdair uccaritais teùāü saübandhaþ samavasthitaþ  // 3.3.1 // 
pratipattur bhavaty arthe jñāne vā saüśayaþ kva cit  / 
svarūpeùūpalabhyeùu vyabhicāro na vidyate  // 3.3.2 // 
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et contra 
A very strong objection to the idea of self-reference can be found in the 
Saübandha-samuddeśa (VP 3.3.26), which claims that a signifier cannot be the 
signified thing in the same context (pravçtta).  
This problem arises in connection with the so-called Unnameability Thesis (the 
term introduced by H. and R. Herzberger (Herzberger H., and R. Herzberger 1981)). 
This thesis claims that there is something which is unnameable. An example of such 
unnameable thing is relation which, being extremely dependent upon the entities it 
joins, can be defined only through them, but not per se. As Raghunātha Śarmā observes 
in his commentary on Helārāja, ‘relation is only deduced from its auxiliary status.’24 
As a result, the question naturally arises whether to call something ‘insignifiable’ 
means to signify it. If yes, it would thus be apprehended as signifiable, otherwise there 
would be no understanding of the issue spoken about.25 These kārikās (VP 3.3.20–21) 
are well-known as Bhartçhari’s paradox, similar to the Liar paradox in Greek 
philosophy, and were extensively studied by different scholars (for an exhaustive 
analysis of these inquiries, see Houben (Houben 1995b) and also a more recent article 
by Parsons (Parsons 2001) where a formalized study of the paradox is undertaken). 
As Houben (Houben 1995c: 232) points out, “in contrast with most Western 
treatments of the paradox, for Bhartçhari ‘true or false’ is not an interesting question, 
but whether or not the speaker succeeds in expressing his point.” Thus, VP 3.3.20–1 
can be called a paradox not in the formal logical, but in the etymological sense: 
something ‘against’ (‘para’) ‘[common] opinion’ (‘dox’) (REPh 1998). A verbal 
communication is not successful unless the hearer understands the intention of the 
speaker. The situation described in the kārikās seems to be of this sort. Still it is obvious 
that somehow people manage to deal with this kind of expressions. 
Therefore, Bhartçhari claims, when something is spoken of as unsignifiable, the 
very situation of unsignifiability is not prohibited.26 A signifier cannot be the signified 
thing in the same context (pravçtta). That by means of which something is expressed 
cannot be expressed at the same time.27 According to Helārāja, it happens so because of 
the unidirectional function (vyāpārasyaikatva) of the sense organs on account of which 
it is impossible to fix attention on the meaning and the proper form of the word 
simultaneously (Vākyapadīya 1991: 266). 
____________ 
24
 upakāreõa sarvatrānumīyamānasvarūpasattvaþ saübandhaþ (Vākyapadīya 1991: 247). 
25
 avācyam iti yad vācyaü tad avācyatayā yadā  / 
vācyam ity avasīyeta vācyam eva tadā bhavet  // 3.3.20 // 
athāpy avācyam ity evaü na tad vācyaü pratīyate  / 
vivakùitāsya yāvasthā saiva nādhyavasīyate  // 3.3.21 // 
26
 tathānyathā sarvathā ca yasyāvācyatvam ucyate  / 
tatrāpi naiva sāvasthā taiþ śabdaiþ pratiùidhyate  // 3.3.22 // 
27
 na ca vācakarūpeõa pravçttasyāsti vācyatā  / 
pratipādyaü na tat tatra yenānyat pratipadyate  // 3.3.26 // 
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Synthesis 
The total rejection of the self-reference, however, apparently contradicts the 
passage VP 1.51–70, especially the kārikā 1.58 which proclaims the word to function 
differently from the sense organs the form of which is not apprehended when they 
reveal an object.28 
Thus, on the one hand, Bhartçhari cannot neglect the obvious cases of self-reference 
which were already pointed out by his predecessors. On the other hand, these facts can 
be hardly explained by means of traditional concepts. This is why, in the 
Saübandha-samuddeśa 28 (VP 3.3.28), Bhartçhari proposes a very advanced and 
distinguished solution. He claims that during one process no other process is operative, 
therefore there would be no contradiction or infinite regress.29 That is to say, while 
expressing the meaning of the word ‘unsignifiable,’ the very process of expressing 
cannot simultaneously be the object of another activity.30 
With respect to the question of self-reference of the word, this means that in some 
vyāvahārika situations, e.g., in the situation of asking to repeat one’s words, 
śabdasvarūpa is really the actual signified aspect of the word. But there will be no 
possibility of infinite regress, because the act of knowledge, which leads to this regress, 
cannot take place at the same moment. In other communicative situations, though the 
proper form is also present as a potential word-meaning, it is not emphasized because it 
is shaded by the external referent. Thus, in this kārikā the paradox is eliminated by the 
recourse to the successfulness of verbal communication. 
The ontological basis of such solution can be found in VP 1.59: 
Two aspects of a word, distinguished artificially and perceived as separate, stipulate 
different activities without contradiction.31 
As Harivçùabha notes:  
[…] although potencies of the expressed and the expresser are extracted artificially from the 
words by mental procedure (buddhyā), in grammar different operations are prescribed with 
regard to the signifier, signified and their relation, etc., as if these were independent objects.32 
This kārikā 1.59 can be called the methodological credo of the VP. The word 
apoddhāra from which the derivative is used can be translated as ‘analysis, artificial 
extraction of parts from an integral unit.’33 
____________ 
28
 nendriyāõāü prakāśye ‘rthe svarūpaü gçhyate tathā  // 1.58 // 
29
 vyāpārasyāparo yasmān na vyāpāro ‘sti kaś ca na  / 
virodham anavasthāü vā tasmāt sarvatra nāśrayet  // 3.3.28 // 
30
 Cf. Helarāja on 3.3.28: avācyaśabdasya svārthapratipādane yo vyāpāro ‘bhidhālakùaõ- 
astasyānyo vyāpāraþ svaviùayastadānīmeva nāsti [...] (Vākyapadīya 1991: 271). 
31
 bhedenāvagçhītau dvau śabdadharmāv apoddhçtau  / 
bhedakāryeùu hetutvam avirodhena gacchataþ  // 1.59 // 
32
 [...] śabdeùvapi buddhyā parigçhītagrāhyagrāhakaśaktyapoddhāreùu mukhyārthaviùayāõi iva 
śāstre saüjñāsaüjñisaübandhādīni bhedakāryāõi vidhīyante (Vākyapadīya 1966: 117). 
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Ontologically, the word is integral. This is why all the modes of linguistic analysis 
carried out in VP have the nature of apoddhāra. It means that all the elements extracted 
from the word in the course of this analysis are ultimately unreal. But they are valid 
when we describe the processes that take place at the level of the relative operative 
reality. Each kind of activity, i.e. each kind of communicative situation, has its own 
reality which in some way differs from the realities of other situations.  
In the text of VP these different pragmatic realities are correlated by different types 
of analysis. Thus, while questioning how the ontologically indivisible word can 
manifest itself in the plurality of sounds at the acoustic level or in at least two meanings 
(the external referent and the proper form) at the level of semantics, in each case such 
questioning possesses a particular structure and implies a specific underlying reality. 
The elements that  are relevant in the context of one activity are not valid in the context 
of another. For example, the proper form is the only thing-meant of the word while 
asking to repeat one’s words or while giving a definition (VP 1.58, 1.57), but in some 
other situations (e.g., the one mentioned in VP 3.3.27) the apprehension of the proper  
form is shaded by the external referent (cf. the Helarāja’s commentary on VP 3.3.2). 
Therefore, paradoxes appear only in a formal, logical treatment of the language, in 
which the specific character of different kinds of activity is ignored. 
Two aspects of the word, spoken of in VP 1.59, refer directly to the kārikā 1.44 
where the two upādānaśabdas in the word are postulated for the first time. It was 
already noted that in the passage after this kārikā Bhartçhari introduced several pairs of 
such aspects. But perhaps the most general of them is the distinction of grāhaka and 
grāhya, the expresser and the thing expressed. 
Thus, in VP 1.59 the question of the ontological plurality of the word has been 
eliminated. The solution is based on the idea that each thing can be cognized not per se 
but only in the context of the activity in which it is involved. 
Let us get back to the problem of the signifiability of relation, formulated at the 
beginning of the Saübandha-samuddeśa. According to the solution expounded in VP 
3.3.28, the word ‘relation’ can be efficiently used in verbal communication. It does not 
mean, however, that this or some other designation must define the relation per se 
(svadharmeõa – VP 3.3.4). In other words, practical efficiency is not identical to 
objectivity. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
33
 According to Subramania Iyer’s definition: “Whenever what is united in reality is divided 
merely for practical purposes, there is apoddhāra” (Subramania Iyer 1992: 220). This word is very 
symptomatically used at the beginning of the Jāti-samuddeśa concerning the extraction (apoddhçtya) 
of the words from the sentence, and immediately, in the second kāõóa, it was proclaimed to be an 
indivisible unit. 
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Conclusion 
According to Bhartçhari’s method, alternative grammatical theories are overcome 
and transcended by non-dualistic ontology. This ontology, however, does not reject the 
relative value of the theories by means of which different aspects of the 
language–world relation can be explained. 
Certain parallels can be drawn between Bhartçhari’s emphasis on the role of the 
practical (vyāvahārika) situation stipulating the character of the philosophical 
discourse, and some ideas of modern Western philosophy (instrumentalism, 
functionalism and especially the Moscow methodological circle founded by G.P. Shche- 
drovitskii). Still all these schools contest metaphysics, and it was only Bhartçhari who 
managed to combine, in a dialectical way, ontology with everyday practice. 
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